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  • Using DNS to weaken Locky ransomware threat

    Ransomware and other cyberthreats often go unseen by traditional detection methods like antivirus, deep packet inspection (DPI) or sandboxing. In fact, a report by Lastline Labs indicates that 51% of zero-day malware—threats that strike before developers have time to release a patch—is undetected by anti-virus solutions. So what can security professionals do to stop attacks? The answer lies, in part, in DNS.

    One of the most powerful ransomware threats currently targeting individuals and organizations is Locky, which infects up to 100,000 devices per day, of which 3% submit payments. Cybersecurity experts estimate that Locky possesses 17% of the entire global market share for all ransomware infections.

    First, let’s look at a few statistics that demonstrate the power and expense of Locky:

    Locky is typically delivered through aggressive spam campaigns, often claiming to be an invoice. Despite the known dangers of clicking on links in unknown emails, Locky is so sly it entices even trained IT staff to click on obscure messages and activate downloads.

    Once a download has completed, Locky connects with its Command & Control (C&C) server to get a cryptographic key to use for encryption. There are three known mechanisms for Locky to reach its C&C hosts:

    1. Direct IP communication
    2. A number of fixed domains
    3. A time-based Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) that creates a set of random-looking domains that are only valid for a few days

    Here is where DNS can play a role. DNS data can be analyzed to identify C&C connection mechanisms. When these communications are blocked, Locky’s ability to obtain encryption keys is limited, giving infected users a better chance of being protected.

    Unfortunately, the DGA used by Locky to generate domains and get encryption keys is marked with the current time period combined with a secret seed, making it harder to block new domains quickly. Locky changes seeds frequently, and reverse engineering current versions of the malware to discover each new seed takes time. Every new seed indicates another wave in the life of the exploit, so until there is an accurate way to identify traffic associated with Locky, it can’t be permanently blocked.

    But examination of a worldwide feed of anonymized DNS queries, along with anomaly detection and correlation technology, makes it possible to identify suspected domains used by Locky to download encryption keys in real time. ForcePoint is one company that has done some work to reverse engineer the DGA used by Locky. By using the existing DGA and conducting some additional processing of suspect domains, it is possible to determine new seeds used by Locky, thereby enumerating all future new domains Locky will use.

    Below is a sampling of more recent domains created by Locky as detected by our DNS algorithms:

    • mrjuvawlwa[.]xyz
    • uydvrqwgg[.]su
    • uwiyklntlxpxj[.]work
    • owvtbqledaraqq[.]su
    • udfaexci[.]ru
    • eabfhwl[.]ru
    • olyedawaki[.]pl
    • uxwfukfqxhydqawmf[.]su
    • ikdcjjcyjtpsc[.]work
    • wrbwtvcv[.]su
    • osxbymbjwuotd[.]click
    • qtuanjdpx[.]info

    As Locky and other types of ransomware become more adept at avoiding detection and remediation, new strategies need to be used to combat them. Many of the new cyberthreat strategies make traditional malware block lists less effective. Facing DGAs with fast-changing seeds, security researchers must constantly identify the new seeds used by each wave of phishing to pre-generate domains. Once new seeds are released the old ones immediately become obsolete.

    By utilizing a broad set of DNS query data, it is possible to detect and track the evolution of generated domains through a variety of algorithmic methods such as clustering, reputation scoring, reverse engineering and additional methods that continuously evolve. Recent innovations include anomaly detection algorithms, new domain clustering and a Domain Reputation System that resulted in almost 100,000 domains and C&Cs provisioned daily for blocking.

    By employing these advanced methods, suspicious domains can be detected with a high level of accuracy very quickly, and false positives can also be weeded out so good traffic can still reach legitimate sites. Currently, this is the best defense against Locky. Service providers and companies can use this technique to protect their online users from having their files encrypted, and identify machines that have been infected.

    Locky provides ample evidence that attackers are continuously innovating. Staying one step ahead requires cybersecurity expertise and real-time processing of massive, worldwide data sets to uncover malicious activity. Blocking traffic to these domains is a good way to avoid the threat of Locky, and expert security teams that take the right steps to understand its behavior and put appropriate measures in place to protect would-be victims will render cyberthreats much less effective.


  • New Spam Campaign Distributes Locky Ransomware and Kovter Trojan Combined

    Criminals have taken a liking to the idea of combining multiple types of malware into one distribution campaign. Malware Protection Center researchers discovered a string of email messages using malicious attachments to spread both Locky ransomware and the Kovter Trojan. It is not the first time these two types of malware are distributed in the same campaign, as dual-pronged spam campaigns have become more common as of late.

    This morning we noticed the start of a campaign using  New notice to Appear in Court as the email subject. The attachments are identical to the Typical .JS, .WSF, .lnk file inside a double zip. All the sites seen so far today are the same sites used in the USPS, FedEx, UPS current campaigns.  I am sure that both campaigns will continue side by side. It is very likely that different “affiliates” are using the same distribution network, but each one prefers a different email lure to gain victims.

    The attachments all start with a zip named along the lines of Notice_00790613.zip which contain another zip Notice_00790613.doc.zip which in turn contains Notice_00790613.doc.js

    Criminals Step Up Malware Distribution

    It is rather disconcerting to learn opening a malicious email attachment can introduce two different types of malware at the same time. As if the Locky ransomware is not annoying to deal with on its own, computer users will also be affected by the Kovter Trojan. This latter piece of malware specialized in click fraud, generating a lot of illegal advertisement revenue for criminals.

    Through a malicious email attachment, criminals execute a script that contains links to multiple domains where the malware types are downloaded from. By making the attachment a .Ink file, the recipient may click it and have the payload download executed in the background. PowerShell scripts have become a fan favorite among criminals targeting Windows users these days, that much is certain.

    Researchers discovered a total of five hardcoded domains in the script from where the malware can be downloaded. Both the Locky ransomware and Kovter Trojan payloads are hosted on these platforms, and it is expected more of these domains will continue to pop up over time. Although law enforcement agencies can take down these domains rather easily, criminals will not hesitate to create additional hosting solutions over time.

    As one would expect from these spam email campaigns, the message in question is a fake receipt for a spoofed USPS delivery email. In the attached zip file, there is the malicious .Ink file , which initiates the PowerShell script once opened. One interesting aspect about this script is how it checks if the file is downloaded successfully and if is at least 10KB in size. Once that has been verified, it will stop the process automatically.

    Microsoft researchers feel the use of multiple domain names to download the payload from is a powerful obfuscation technique. Blacklisting one specific URL is a lot easier than dealing with a handful of different domains. Moreover, this method seems to hint at how criminals can easily add more servers to download the malicious payloads from if they want to. A very troublesome development, to say the least.

    Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of this new malware distribution campaign is how criminals continue to update the payloads themselves. Both Kovter and Locky receive regular updates, which means the development of ransomware and click-fraud Trojans is still going on behind the scenes. Moreover, it goes to show criminals will continue to rely on multi-pronged distribution campaigns for malware and ransomware moving forward.


  • Proteus botnet Malware with Remote Access

     

    The Proteus botnet emerged toward the end of November 2016.  Only a few samples of it were found in the wild and, at the moment, it doesn’t seem to have a widespread campaign.  So, what does it do? It launches a multi-layered attack on an infected machine where it runs several processes aimed at coin mining, credential theft, and keylogging.  In addition, the bot can perform on its own; it offers the cybercriminal to send commands over HTTP to download malicious executables and execute them.

     

    In some samples, the botnet disguises itself as a Google Chrome executable. The functionality of the botnet is highly reliant on its C&C (command and control) server, hxxp://proteus-network[.]biz or hxxp://proteus-network[.]ml (the latter is inaccessible). The URL is hardcoded in the sample and is contacted multiple times to obtain necessary credentials for the tasks the botnet performs. The host name also appears in Pastebin, under the URL hxxp://pastebin[.]com/raw/LidbEiiR, in its encrypted form, and the botnet can retrieve the domain from there as well.

     

    The botnet starts by identifying the infected machine and obtaining the operating system’s info (whether 64 or 86 bit), the machine’s name, and the Windows version. All of the information is sent to the C&C to “register” the machine.

     

    After the machine is acknowledged by the C&C, the botnet proceeds to perform different tasks. As the botnet contacts the C&C to receive various pieces of information, the web requests are sent along with an encrypted string specifying the purpose of the request. These encrypted strings perform the following functions:

     

    • api/register – Register the infected machine
    • api/ping – Check if the machine is already registered
    • api/module – Check the mining module
    • api/proxy – Use reverse proxy
    • api/command – Receive commands from the C&C
    • api/account – Receive an account from the C&C
    • api/log – Handle the key logging document

     

    The header section of the HTTP requests is similar throughout the different sections of the source code:

    Content-type: application-json

    Authorization: {2D592824-48DE-49F8-8F96-A40B3904C794}

     

    When contacting the C&C, a POST request is sent with one of the above modes appended to the domain’s name, for example, hxxp://proteus-network.biz/api/log. The C&C sends a response to this request, which is then parsed by the botnet in search for the C&C’s reply.

     

    CheckerTask:

     

    The CheckerTask starts by contacting the C&C with the api/account string appended to the domain’s name. After sending a POST request, it receives a four-tuple composed of an account ID, an e-mail, a password, and the account type. The botnet attempts to access and steal the user’s credentials from a number of online websites, including:

     

    • eBay.com
    • otto.de
    • amazon.de
    • breuninger.com
    • dhl.de
    • netflix.com
    • coderbay.net
    • zalando.de

     

    The majority of these websites are German-based and the botnet searches for German words appearing in the responses. This leads us to believe this specific sample of Proteus targets are German victims. For example, if the message received from the website includes the phrase “stimmen nicht mit den bei uns hinterlegten Daten”, which means, “This does not match the data provided by us”. The botnet attempts to change the password’s first character from lower case to upper case or to append the character “1” to the end of the password and tries to log in again after three seconds. The response from the website is then checked to harvest more information about the victim, including name, address, country, bought and sold items, seller type and the last feedback received.

     

    Some of the websites which the CheckerTask tries to steal the credentials from may include a Captcha to prevent such automated logins. The Proteus botnet uses Death by Captcha (DBC), an API which solves any given Captcha and turns it into a text that the botnet can insert into the website, and proceeds with the login. Using DBC requires a username and a password, which are both hardcoded into the sample to enable Captcha analysis. We have managed to access the DBC account used in the sample, and found that it resolved 200 Captchas so far, which could hint to the number of successfully infected machines.

     

    LoggerTask:

     

    This task performs key logging on the infected machine. It starts by initializing a list of all the keyboard keys, and stores the logged keys into a file called tmpV213.txt found under the TEMP directory. When this file includes more than 250 characters, it is cleared and its content is sent to the C&C along with the api/log string.

     

    CommandsTask:

     

    This task receives commands from the C&C. The botnet sends a request to the C&C with the fingerprint and the api/command string. If the C&C sends a command to download a file, a new directory is created in the TEMP folder using a GUID, and a file called temp.exe is created in that directory. Alternatively, if the command is to “kill”, the process is killed. The task checks for new commands every two minutes.

     

    MiningTask, EMiningTask:

     

    The C&C determines the type of mining which the infected machine attempts, as well as the mining pool it will join. The EminingTask downloads an executable to the TEMP directory with the name loader.exe. The types of mining that appear in the sample are CPU, Zcash, Scrypt, and SHA256. During the mining task, and depending on the chosen type, the resources of the infected machine, such as the memory, CPU, and RAM, are used to provide the computing power necessary to produce the hashes accepted as a proof of work by each method. Even using a pool instead of individual mining, CPU usage soared rapidly and reached 100% in our labs when we ran the sample, which shows the processing power needed for the mining tasks.

     

    Conclusion:

     

    To summarize, the botnet conducts a complex attack: it infects a machine, steals credentials, logs keys and mines for currency, causing CPU level to reach 100%. Although the botnet has many of the crucial implementation tools needed for its attack, it heavily depends on communication with its C&C server and the information it transmits for the execution of its most basic functions.


  • Ransomeware Decrypters Available Decryption Service – Decryptor Download Decrypt Files

    New version of ODCODCDecoder Released Download Decrypter

    BloodDolly has released a new version of his ODCODC Ransomwaredecryptor. The decryptor can be downloaded from.

    Emsisoft Decrypter for Marlboro Download Decrypter

    The Marlboro ransomware was first seen on January 11th, 2017. It is written in C++ and uses a simple XOR-based encryption algorithm. Encrypted files are renamed to “.oops”. The ransom note is stored inside a file named “_HELP_Recover_Files_.html” and includes no further point of contact.

    Due to a bug in the malware’s code, the malware will truncate up to the last 7 bytes from files it encrypts. It is, unfortunately, impossible for the decrypter to reconstruct these bytes.

    To use the decrypter, you will require an encrypted file of at least 640 bytes in size as well as its unencrypted version. To start the decrypter select both the encrypted and unencrypted file and drag and drop them onto the decrypter executable.

    Decryptor released for the Merry Christmas or Merry X-Mas Ransomware Download Decrypter

    Fabian Wosar has done it again and released a decryptor for the files encrypted by the Merry Christmas or Merry X-Mas Ransomware. These files will have the extensions .PEGS1, .MRCR1, .RARE1, .RMCM1 appended to them.

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    BitStakDecrypter Download Download Decrypter

    lphaDecrypter Download Download Decrypte

    Unlock92Decrypter Download Download Decrypter

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    Rannoh Decryptor (updated 20-12-2016 with CryptXXX v3) Download Decrypter

    RannohDecryptor tool is designed to decrypt files encrypted by:

    • CryptXXX versions 1, 2 and 3.
    • Marsjoke aka Polyglot;
    • Rannoh;
    • AutoIt;
    • Fury;
    • Crybola;
    • Cryakl;

    Globe3 Decryptor Download Decrypter
    The tool is designed to decrypt files encrypted by Globe3 Ransomware.

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    Rakhni Decryptor (updated 14-11-2016) Download Decrypter

    RakhniDecryptor tool is designed to decrypt files encrypted by:

    • Crysis;
    • Chimera;
    • Rakhni;
    • Agent.iih;
    • Aura;
    • Autoit;
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    • Lamer;
    • Lortok;
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    • Bitman (TeslaCrypt) version 3 and 4.

    Trend Micro Ransomware File Decryptor Download Decrypter

    Supported Ransomware Families

    The following list describes the known ransomware-encrypted files types can be handled by the latest version of

    the tool.

    Ransomware

    File name and extension

    CryptXXX V1, V2, V3*

    {original file name}.crypt, cryp1, crypz, or 5 hexadecimal characters

    CryptXXX V4, V5

    {MD5 Hash}.5 hexadecimal characters

    Crysis

    .{id}.{email address}.xtbl, crypt

    TeslaCrypt V1**

    {original file name}.ECC

    TeslaCrypt V2**

    {original file name}.VVV, CCC, ZZZ, AAA, ABC, XYZ

    TeslaCrypt V3

    {original file name}.XXX or TTT or MP3 or MICRO

    TeslaCrypt V4

    File name and extension are unchanged

    Rating:

    485 found this helpful

    Category:

    Troubleshoot

    Solution Id:

    1114221

    13/12/2016, 22)42

    Using the Trend Micro Ransomware File Decryptor Tool

    Page 2 of 6

    https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1114221#

    #

    TeslaCrypt V4

    File name and extension are unchanged

    SNSLocker

    {Original file name}.RSNSLocked

    AutoLocky

    {Original file name}.locky

    BadBlock

    {Original file name}

    777

    {Original file name}.777

    XORIST

    {Original file name}.xorist or random extension

    XORBAT

    {Original file name}.crypted

    CERBER V1

    {10 random characters}.cerber

    Stampado

    {Original file name}.locked

    Nemucod

    {Original file name}.crypted

    Chimera

    {Original file name}.crypt

    LECHIFFRE

    {Original file name}.LeChiffre

    MirCop

    Lock.{Original file name}

    Jigsaw

    {Original file name}.random extension

    Globe/Purge

    V1: {Original file name}.purge

    V2: {Original file name}.{email address + random characters}

    V3: Extension not fixed or file name encrypted

    DXXD

    V1: {Original file name}.{Original extension}dxxd

    Teamxrat/Xpan

    V2: {Original filename}.__xratteamLucked

    Crysis

    .{id}.{email address}.xtbl, crypt

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    Linux.Encoder Decryptor download

    Decryption tools have been designed for infections of the Linux.Encoder.1 and Linux.Encoder.3 ransomware

     


  • Ransomware developers look to educate victims and Help Decrypt files

    Knowledge is good, At least according to the cybercriminals who are developing ransomware that will give a free decryption key if the victim reads two articles about ransomware.

    A new variant of Koolova was discovered by security researcher Michael Gillespie, that demands the victim read two articles: a Google Security Blog, Stay safe while browsing, and a Bleeping Computer article, Jigsaw Ransomware Decrypted: Will delete your files until you pay the Ransom.

    Lawrence Abrams, said the ransomware itself behaves like Jigsaw in that once it encrypts the files it delivers a scrolling note telling the victim to read stories or else risk having their files deleted. In Jigsaw’s case the demand is for a ransom payment.


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  • Windows 10 Surveillance Platform weaponized into and back ported Implants delivered seamlessly to Windows 7 and 8 via Windows Update

    Windows 10 Surveillance Platform weaponized into and back ported Implants delivered seamlessly to Windows 7 and 8 via Windows Update

    You may or may not have noticed shenanigans in your windows based 7 and * machines.

    Microsoft likes the data they stream from windows 10 machines soo much that they decided to back port functionaly and carve out impants resulting in a of push 4 optional and 2 important windows updates

    They will appear in control panel installed updates as

    Optional
    “Update for Microsoft Windows (KB3068708)”
    “Update for Microsoft Windows (KB3075249)”
    “Update for Microsoft Windows (KB3080149)”
    “Update for Microsoft Windows (KB3022345)”

    Important
    “Update for Microsoft Windows (KB2952664)”
    “Update for Microsoft Windows (KB3021917)”

    If you have better things to do than hand eye troll through the list of installed updates then here are two approached to detect the SurveillanceWare Implants.

    The referenced KB’s are specific to the surveillance implants which target Windows 7 only. If your running windows 8, 8.1 or 10 your more than likely fighting much more of a loosing battle. So this section is specific so where it may be temporarily possible to remove the Implants.

    Detection – Open an elevated command prompt
    wmic QFE list full /format:texttablewsys | find “KB3068708”
    wmic QFE list full /format:texttablewsys | find “KB3022345”
    wmic QFE list full /format:texttablewsys | find “KB3075249”
    wmic QFE list full /format:texttablewsys | find “KB3080149”
    wmic QFE list full /format:texttablewsys | find “KB3021917”
    wmic QFE list full /format:texttablewsys | find “KB2952664”

    or alternatively detect with an update to the systeminfo command

    systeminfo | findstr “KB3068708 KB3022345 KB3075249 KB3080149 KB3021917 KB2952664”

    To start removal after optionally taking an evidence image or a system backup
    wusa /uninstall /kb:3068708 /quiet /norestart
    wusa /uninstall /kb:3022345 /quiet /norestart

    Then reboot seems required then continue
    wusa /uninstall /kb:3075249 /quiet /norestart
    wusa /uninstall /kb:3080149 /quiet /norestart
    wusa /uninstall /kb:3021917 /quiet /norestart
    wusa /uninstall /kb:2952664 /quiet /norestart

    ———- Windows 7, 8, 8.1 script to detect implants——-
    Here is a list and updated DIY detection ready scripting for all 14 (currently known) Surveillance implants. Including Implants for windows 8 and later.

    I guess they thought they could catch more fish with 14 baited lines.

    Here are two batch files . run the larger script to see whats detected.

    Open an elevated command prompt

    create a batch file
    Name: check-kb.bat

    Add the batch script content

    @echo off
    echo ‘ Only the first parameter is used in the search, the rest display context.
    echo ‘
    echo ‘
    echo Checking for %1 %2 %3 %4 %5 %6 %7 %8 %9 %10
    @echo on
    wmic QFE list full /format:texttablewsys | find “%1”
    @echo off

    Create a batch file, purpose is to check for currently known Implants.
    Name: checkfor_NPI_patches.bat

    Add the batch script content

    @echo off
    SetLocal
    REM — (as of 2015-08-26):
    cls
    call Check-kb KB3012973 – Opt in payload – Upgrade to Windows 10 Pro
    call Check-kb KB3021917 – Opt in payload – Update to benchmark Windows 7 SP1
    call Check-kb KB3035583 – Opt in payload – delivers reminder “Get Windows 10” for Windows 8.1 and Windows 7 SP1
    call Check-kb KB2952664 – Opt in payload – Pre launch day push of payload for compatibility update for upgrading Windows 7
    call Check-kb KB2976978 – Opt in payload – Pre launch day push of payload for Compatibility update for Windows 8.1 and Windows 8
    call Check-kb KB3022345 – Opt in payload – surveillance Telemetry [Replaced by KB3068708]
    call Check-kb KB3068708 – Opt in payload – Update for surveillance customer experience and diagnostic telemetry
    call Check-kb KB2990214 – Opt in payload – Update that prepares payload to Windows 7 to add surveillance in later installed versions of Windows
    call Check-kb KB3075249 – Opt in payload – Update that adds surveillance telemetry to Windows 8.1 and Windows 7
    call Check-kb KB3080149 – Opt in payload – Update for CIP and surveillance with diagnostic exfil leveraging telemetry
    call Check-kb KB3044374 – Opt in payload – Marketing Windows 10 surveillance payload to windows 8,8.1 devices
    call Check-kb KB2977759 – Opt in payload – Windows 10 surveillance Diagnostics Compatibility Telemetry HTTP request response
    call Check-kb KB3050265 – Opt in payload – Marking via Windows Update services opting in to Windows 10 surveillance Implant
    call Check-kb KB3068707 – Opt in payload – CIP telemetry request response check in for Windows 7,8,8.1

    Whatever Surveillance implants revealed in your machine, it can be removed with a customization of the wusa command, just replace the ??????? with the kb numbers reported.

    wusa /uninstall /kb:??????? /quiet /norestart
    ——-Housekeeping QA

    Housekeeping checks post removal additional steps. I can foresee someone will prophetically conclude a recommended step 5) Uninstall windows and install a secure *nix variant. Obligatorily mentioned in advance. Thanks.

    An eye on post removal Hinkyness had some hits after removals and reboots.

    1) Only two of the four uninstalled KB’s reappeared as available optional “Update for Windows 7 for x64 based Systems (KB3075249) and (KB3080149), another reappeared as

    Important “Update for Windows 7 for x64 based Systems (KB3068708)”

    The important one was the “Update for customer experience and diagnostic telemetry” Important to who, NSA?

    The “KB3068708″ Update for customer experience and diagnostic telemetry” did not reappear as an available patch. It may be dependent on one of the other three removed bits
    2) Before the uninstall, I had foresight to search the infected file system
    for .manifest with a common namespace string called assemblyIdentity which is set to a string value “Microsoft-Windows-Authentication-AuthUI.Resources”

    The before removal search listing files which matched the above search constraint yielded 62 matches in 52 manifest files.

    The after removal search listing of files which match the above search constraint yields 74 matches in 64 manifest files.
    Conclusion, the removal did not remove the manifest files pushed in the original infection.
    3) In a read of KB 3080149, it indicated it installed and updates / requires maintenance of a file named utc.app.json

    Before removal, the file file was found in 6 places on the infected filesystem
    After “removal” the file exists in the same 6 locations, same filesize just waiting for re-use and reinfection.

    discovered and removed using the disribed method 22 additional implants
    Found all 6 utc.app.json were removed and it had left two backup copies under the name utc.app.json.bk
    in
    C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Diagnosis\DownloadedSettings
    C:\Users\All Users\Microsoft\Diagnosis\DownloadedSettings
    in the same directory, found a backed up file telemetry.ASM-WindowsDefault.json.bk

    In order to see the hidden system directory, you must elevate to admin
    dir wont show the rest of the telemetry files unless you clear the files attributes
    An Elevated file explorer will show the files
    Files wont be readable until you change owner permissions or change your running user principal context to that which does allow access to the file.

    telemetry file content
    {
    “settings”: {
    “Microsoft-ApplicationInsights:::sampleRate”: “100”,
    “Microsoft-ApplicationInsights-Dev:::sampleRate”: “100”,
    “Microsoft-ApplicationInsights-Dev:::latency”: “Realtime”,
    “xbox.xsapi:::sampleRate”: “100”,
    “Office:::sampleRate”: “100”,
    “Skype:::sampleRate”: “100”,
    “Census:::sampleRate”: “100”,
    “Microsoft.Windows.Appraiser.General::ms.CriticalData:sampleRate”: “100”,
    “Microsoft.Windows.Appraiser.Instrumentation::ms.Telemetry:sampleRate”: “100”,
    “Microsoft.Windows.Compatibility.Asl::ms.Telemetry:sampleRate”: “5”,
    “Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.General::ms.CriticalData:sampleRate”: “100”,
    “MicrosoftTelemetry::ms.CriticalData:sampleRate”: “0”,
    “MicrosoftTelemetry::ms.Measures:sampleRate”: “0”,
    “MicrosoftTelemetry::ms.Telemetry:sampleRate”: “0”,
    “Setup360Telemetry::ms.CriticalData:sampleRate”: “100”,
    “SetupPlatformTel::ms.CriticalData:sampleRate”: “100”,
    “TelClientSynthetic:HeartBeat_5::sampleRate”: “100”
    }}
    content file of utc.app.json
    {
    “settings”: {
    “UTC:::GroupDefinition.MicrosoftTelemetry”: “f4-Redacted data-6aa”,
    “UTC:::CategoryDefinition.ms.CriticalData”: “140-Redacted data-318”,
    “UTC:::CategoryDefinition.ms.Measures”: “71-Redacted data-63”,
    “UTC:::CategoryDefinition.ms.Telemetry”: “321-Redacted data-32”,
    “UTC:::GroupDefinition.Microsoft-ApplicationInsights”: “0d-Redacted data-d0b”,
    “UTC:::GroupDefinition.Microsoft-ApplicationInsights-Dev”: “ba-Redacted data-3d”,
    “UTC:::GroupDefinition.xbox.xsapi”: “53b-Redacted data-af3”,
    “UTC:::GroupDefinition.Office”: “8DB-Redacted data-155”,
    “UTC:::GroupDefinition.Skype”: “9df-Redacted data-a89”,
    “UTC:::DownloadScenariosFromOneSettings”: “1”
    }

    To mitigate future infection, am considering removal alteration or perform a revocation of file permissions to utc.app.json and the hinky manifest files.

    4)Re the connections the malware opened, which may or may not have Mitm certificate pinning mitigation. My personal opinion is to mitigate by locking access to the data ex filtration end points.

    Firewall now blocks outbound access from your network to
    vortex-win.data.microsoft.com
    Name: VORTEX-cy2.metron.live.com.nsatc.net
    Address: 64.4.54.254
    Aliases: vortex-win.data.microsoft.com
    vortex-win.data.metron.live.com.nsatc.net
    vortex.data.glbdns2.microsoft.com

    settings-win.data.microsoft.com
    Non-authoritative answer:
    Name: OneSettings-bn2.metron.live.com.nsatc.net
    Address: 65.55.44.108
    Aliases: settings-win.data.microsoft.com
    settings.data.glbdns2.microsoft.com

    Chances are that anything outbound to “.data.microsoft” should likely be blackholed if you opt out of the “Idiots Do Opt Having Pervasive Surveillance Patches” IDOH-PSP program for short.

    Hope this helps to bring most of the malware workflow, as is early info on this new day of vendor sponsored in your face implants, info will likely be incomplete.


  • Free Windows Desktop Software Security List – IP-Blocking Pop-up Blocker and more

    IP-Blocking / Popup-Blocker / Hardening

    IP filtering applications:
    Peerblock
    ProtoWall
    Bot Revolt

    HTTP filtering applications:
    NoVirusThanks Website Blocker
    Web Monitor
    Active Wall Web Filter

    Parental control:
    Best Free Parental Filter
    Norton Safety Minder
    Windows Live Family Safety
    Kidzui
    K9 Web Protection
    Avira Social Network Protection
    Parental Control Bar
    Safesquid
    AOL Parental Controls
    DansGuardian
    Kidz CD
    BlockSmart
    Cloudacl Addons (FF,Ch)
    GoGoStat
    FoxFilter (FF,Ch)
    ProCon Latte (FF)
    Profanity Filter (FF, Ch)
    Blocksi (Ch)
    Qustodio
    MinorMonitor
    Kurupira Web Filter
    JuniorWatch
    Safe Internet for kids
    Dns Angel
    See also in this list: Password protect applications

    IP/URL/domain blacklists:
    Spy Eye Tracker
    Zeus Tracker
    Blocklist Manager
    I-Blocklist
    AlienVault
    StopBadware
    OpenDNS
    Threat Log
    DShield
    More

    Domain security:
    Subsections follow.

    1. Domain Name System (DNS):
    Subsections follow.

    1.1 Public DNS servers:
    Norton ConnectSafe
    OpenDNS
    Comodo Secure DNS
    DNS Advantage
    ScrubIT
    FoolDNS
    Google DNS
    Gozoom DNS
    DNSresolvers
    Safe DNS
    CloudNS
    Yandex.DNS
    BA.net
    OpenNIC
    Verisign Public DNS
    More: 1; 2

    1.2. DNS server configuration:
    Public DNS Server Tool
    DNS Helper
    ChrisPC DNS switch
    QuickSetDNS
    Check DNS-settings
    Dns jumper
    DNS Benchmark
    Namebench

    1.3. DNS server applications:
    Unbound
    DNSKong

    1.4. DNS proxies:
    Acrylic

    1.5. DNS encryption:
    Dnssec-Trigger
    DNSSEC Validator (FF)
    DNSSEC or not? 
    DNSCrypt
    SSL-DNS

    2. Hosts file:
    Subsections follow.

    2.1. Information:
    Using the Windows Hosts File for Security and Privacy

    2.2. Third-party hosts files:
    hpHosts
    MVPS HOSTS
    Hostfile
    someonewhocares HOSTS

    2.3. Management:
    Hostsman
    HostsXpert
    BISS Host File Manager; download
    Hostblock
    BlueLifeHosts editor
    PowerShell script
    Hosts Block

    Anti-spam:
    Subsections follow.

    1. Information:
    How to Avoid Getting Spammed
    How to Reduce Spam
    Quickly Block All Future Emails From Selected Senders In Gmail

    2. Spam filtering applications:
    Best Free Spam Filter for the Average User
    Best Free Spam Filter for Experienced Users
    Spam Blockers: The Best Products for Home Use
    SpamAssassin
    SpamBayes
    Spamihilator
    SPAMfighter
    Comodo Antispam
    Mailwasher
    BullGuard Spamfilter
    POPFile
    SpamPal
    ASSP
    Phalanx
    AVS Antispam
    Agnitum Spam Terrier
    SafeMule
    xTerminator
    K9
    AntispamSniper for The Bat!
    SpamFence
    0Spam
    BitDefender 4blogs

    3. Spam blacklists:
    Spamhaus ; Why was my IP address listed on Spamhaus?
    SpamCop Blocking List
    Project Honey Pot
    SURBL
    SORBS
    UCEPROTECT

    Browser element blacklists:
    SpywareBlaster
    ZonedOut
    Adding unwanted sites to the Internet Explorer Restricted Zone


  • E-Payment Alert Notification From Another US Bank – Customer phishing scam

    A slightly unusual phishing scam today

    https://i2.wp.com/myonlinesecurity.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/scam_warning1.gif?fit=300%2C300&ssl=1

    The original email is nothing special and has a blank body and a PDF attachment. The PDF has a link to http://kamzink.com/redirect-new-alert-logon/redirect.htm which redirects you to ( or should redirect you to ) http://rattanhospital.co.in/new-usbank-security-update/usbank.com.online.logon/home  However this site only works in Firefox using Noscript when I block scripts from  omtrdc.net. ( which looks like an Adobe Marketing cloud analytics script)  Allowing scripts from that site display a blank page for me in all browsers.  I assume the phishers made a mistake and that script will only work on the genuine website so is  unable to display the page. This shows the error in just copy & pasting an entire website homepage  & just changing a few links on it.  Anyway, anything the phishers do wrong is a step in the right direction to protect users.

    Please read our How to protect yourselves page for simple, sensible advice on how to avoid being infected by this sort of socially engineered malware.

    The original email looks like this It will NEVER be a genuine email from your bank  any other company so don’t ever click the link in the email. If you do it will lead you to a website that looks at first glance like the genuine usbank website but you can clearly see in the address bar, that it is fake. Some versions of this and similar phishes will ask you fill in the html ( webpage) form that comes attached to the email.

    From: US BANK <unitedbankpayment.alert@communication.com>>

    Date: Wed 28/12/2016 08:15

    Subject: E-Payment Alert Notification From Another US Bank Customer

    Attachment: US_Bank_Payment_2_.pdf

    Body content:  Blank / Empty

    Following the link sends you to a site looking identical to the genuine usbank.com website ( with the above provisos)

    All of these emails use Social engineering tricks to persuade you to open the attachments that come with the email. Whether it is a message saying “look at this picture of me I took last night” and it appears to come from a friend or is more targeted at somebody who regularly is likely to receive PDF attachments or Word .doc attachments or any other common file that you use every day. Or whether it is a straight forward attempt, like this one, to steal your personal, bank, credit card or email and social networking log in details. Be very careful when unzipping them and make sure you have “show known file extensions enabled“, And then look carefully at the unzipped file. If it says .EXE then it is a problem and should not be run or opened.


  • Spoofed FedEx and USPS Kovter and Locky sites Ransomeware Malware Keeps Spreading

    www.ccrepairservices.com
    Locky Ransomeware New CPRS CCRS Computer Repair Miami Fort Lauderdale Website

    Following on from these  [ FEDEX ] [ USPS ]  posts describing the Spoofed FedEx and USPS ( and other delivery services from time to time) I will endeavour to keep up to date with a list of current sites involved in the spreading of this malware. I will also show the command used that day to obtain the malware. I will add each days new sites to the lists, but please remember that old sites are reused daily until taken down by their hosts.  All the sites used in this malware spreading campaign are hacked / compromised sites.

     

    The script tries the first in the list & then moves down until it gets a reply from the server. You never see the first downloaded file ( counter.js by searching on your computer, that is run directly from temp internet files ) Counter.js then downloads  a different variant of counter.js which in turn downloads 01 first, then 02, then 03 until you get to 05. If any site doesn’t have the file, then it moves to the next site in the list for that particular file. Each site on the list has a full set of the files. but it is rare for the site delivering counter.js to actually download from itself, normally that downloads from a different site on the list. All the files ( apart from the original counter.js) pretend to be png ( image files). They are actually all renamed .exe files or a renamed php script listing the files to be encrypted. Counter.js contains the list of sites to download from, which includes many of the sites listed in the original WSF, JS, VBS or other scripting file and normally one or 2 extra ones. to get the second counter.js you need to change the &r=01 at the end of the url to &m=01 ( or 02-05). This second counter.js contains additional sites to download from which frequently includes sites from the previous days lists that are not already included in the WSF or first counter.js.

    I only accidentally  found out about the second /3rd /4th /5th  counter.js when I made a mistake in manually decoding the original wsf file ( and the original counter.js) and mistyped/ miscopied  the &r= and used &m= instead. Obviously it is a belt and braces approach to making sure the actual malware gets downloaded to a victim’s computer when urls or sites are known about and blocked by an antivirus or web filter service.

    25 December 2016:  ( Payload Security report  )

    3spension.com
    minebleue.com
    chaitanyaimpex.org
    break-first.com
    grancaffe.net
    www.meizumalaysia.com
    dreamoutloudcenter.org
    megrelis-avocat.com

    /counter/?a=1DtntZgmur6occ1CY29PJzvAzLsjCXMuyD&m=9488599&i=e5J5zaa6WhR1MYhBZ8L8Rmw2RWRVmbtna9Y_vLRIrGW2mVxU7SBYLhBH9Gj5Mr942yUp7kFWRWAOGtmJ5aqexWRDrTq_rGixe_a-gmVCMQ

    /counter/?i=e5J5zaa6WhR1MYhBZ8L8Rmw2RWRVmbtna9Y_vLRIrGW2mVxU7SBYLhBH9Gj5Mr942yUp7kFWRWAOGtmJ5aqexWRDrTq_rGixe_a-gmVCMQ&a=1DtntZgmur6occ1CY29PJzvAzLsjCXMuyD&r=01

    27 December2016:  ( Payload Security report  )

    lacasadeicuochi.it
    boardedhallgreen.com
    www.memoodgetactive.det.nsw.edu.au
    rebecook.fr
    peachaid.com
    kidsgalaxy.fr
    baltasmenulis.lt
    artss.org

    /counter/?a=1HHDb3PbzDuGitWA7eW5oQFLzRjd1VzqhJ&m=3254807&i=Y5rzyqa6RhRlpx-dpPoqiXX2fW4GipPhNOTHtfBNJDBj6eEd6iZ3Yj9wAD7akn77R5LBqqvQvXIlyx_kYmBdyl0Bi12Qqds7  

    /counter/?i=Y5rzyqa6RhRlpx-dpPoqiXX2fW4GipPhNOTHtfBNJDBj6eEd6iZ3Yj9wAD7akn77R5LBqqvQvXIlyx_kYmBdyl0Bi12Qqds7&a=1HHDb3PbzDuGitWA7eW5oQFLzRjd1VzqhJ&r=01

    28 December 2016:  ( Payload Security report  )

    thanepoliceschool.com
    chimie.iset-liege.be
    partnersforcleanstreams.org

    /counter/?a=1N1rEZQQ9Z3Ju6jggwn7hFU1jXytBTcK7r&m=8429816&i=LXEfbBQo_qDv_k77jrIae7y_BHSSQ_IZeneRTOoRmdDa4RlnJqaUKIl03HhN683DsUx-hkDi_OiCy0bOPjhZTiYm8RSQDBkfCerE

    /counter/?i=LXEfbBQo_qDv_k77jrIae7y_BHSSQ_IZeneRTOoRmdDa4RlnJqaUKIl03HhN683DsUx-hkDi_OiCy0bOPjhZTiYm8RSQDBkfCerE&a=1N1rEZQQ9Z3Ju6jggwn7hFU1jXytBTcK7r&r=01

    29 December 2016:  ( payload Security report)

    cobycaresfoundation.org
    dev.zodia-q.com
    shark1.idhost.kz
    italysfinestdesign.it
    salutgaudi.com
    zodia-q.com

    /counter/?a=13h8Y8z3WfiDFYG7jEWgsqZmPL94z22ca1&m=2365622&i=a5P5yqa6RhR1p80JYSnJbDP0I9KOXtIPtIhrFT4SHyIIqBAg-BghzAkZFkHS2tXw5C3mJYnrwuc1MpOfvGWZGd_STcfaml86P_kj5gA

    /counter/?i=a5P5yqa6RhR1p80JYSnJbDP0I9KOXtIPtIhrFT4SHyIIqBAg-BghzAkZFkHS2tXw5C3mJYnrwuc1MpOfvGWZGd_STcfaml86P_kj5gA&a=13h8Y8z3WfiDFYG7jEWgsqZmPL94z22ca1&r=01

    2nd version today ( Payload Security Report )

    /counter/?=&i=a5P71qa6RhRlpLdtPLsJBpD0aKRuq7EtvIQrHyyE-zmVoG37HDoS-OmdfAXYY-Y0RtEcCwavHQyucNU4JL_PpGxvv0l-mxt00fo&a=16TqYh72RpopqiWR97WGMNtTGTazWFYBg1&r=01

    /counter/?a=16TqYh72RpopqiWR97WGMNtTGTazWFYBg1&m=4831333&i=a5P71qa6RhRlpLdtPLsJBpD0aKRuq7EtvIQrHyyE-zmVoG37HDoS-OmdfAXYY-Y0RtEcCwavHQyucNU4JL_PpGxvv0l-mxt00fo

    31 December 2016: ( Payload Security Report)

    www.iblasoni.com
    aventurarealestatedirectory.com
    www.apogeoform.net
    oytunidil.com
    ocentsinus.com
    sonja.ostrovanka.cz
    instalaciondeairesplit.com

    /counter/?a=1J9cj5Z7UvwkR9Tp1qywXBq994MFZ6dCLn&i=Y5p7yaa6RhRlPVwtx_0twhfOcSziOus6gsFi-6WQ9cGftnod2TtjVWJvU-_2nroNgi-lT8j6sF6rzL02lqFLiuQ20RDPqOBkTCSmGjp6NQ
    /counter/?i=Y5p7yaa6RhRlPVwtx_0twhfOcSziOus6gsFi-6WQ9cGftnod2TtjVWJvU-_2nroNgi-lT8j6sF6rzL02lqFLiuQ20RDPqOBkTCSmGjp6NQ&a=1J9cj5Z7UvwkR9Tp1qywXBq994MFZ6dCLn&r=01

    31 December 2016: update 2 ( Payload Security)

    spiritdoula.net
    www.yabaojiuhe.com
    windycrestrental.com
    maggieellisbusinessconsulting.com
    pn-group.com
    inflation.us

    /counter/?a=16ehyeR9Nhrtgk4z2BrKZVJcKTFYe9Z1Ap&i=Y5r71qa6RhRlpLdvFNp4Tyf0O3puCoDDA0TLPwt-ZnjyqdV140NpvPnVGT2KeqxNu7AHi0Gk1WT6yYGkb0YxpcGpOaMzrto7
    /counter/?i=Y5r71qa6RhRlpLdvFNp4Tyf0O3puCoDDA0TLPwt-ZnjyqdV140NpvPnVGT2KeqxNu7AHi0Gk1WT6yYGkb0YxpcGpOaMzrto7&a=16ehyeR9Nhrtgk4z2BrKZVJcKTFYe9Z1Ap&r=0


  • Mobile banking trojan now has encryption and is targeting over 2000 apps

    Security experts at Kaspersky Lab have discovered a modification of the mobile banking Trojan, Faketoken, which can encrypt user data. Kaspersky Lab has detected several thousand Faketoken installation packages capable of encrypting data, the earliest of which dates back to July 2016.

    Disguised as various programs and games, including Adobe Flash Player, the modified Trojan can also steal credentials from more than 2000 Android financial applications.

    To date, the modified Faketoken has claimed over 16,000 victims in 27 countries, with the most located in Russia, Ukraine, Germany and Thailand.

    The newly added data-encryption capability is unusual in that most mobile ransomware focuses on blocking the device rather than the data, which is generally backed-up to the cloud.

    In Faketoken’s case, the data – including documents and media files such as pictures and videos – is encrypted using AES symmetric encryption which can, in some cases, be decrypted by the victim without paying a ransom.

    During the initial infection process, the Trojan demands administrator rights, permission to overlay other apps or to be a default SMS application – often leaving users with little or no choice but to comply. Among other things, these rights enable Faketoken to steal data: both directly, like contacts and files, and indirectly, through phishing pages.

    The Trojan is designed for data theft on an international scale. Once all the necessary rights are in place, it downloads a database from its command and control server containing phrases in 77 languages for different device localisations.

    These are used to create phishing messages to seize passwords from users’ Gmail accounts. The Trojan can also overlay the Google Play Store, presenting a phishing page to steal credit card details.

    In fact, the Trojan can download a long list of applications for attack and even an HTML template page to generate phishing pages for the relevant apps. Kaspersky Lab researchers uncovered a list of 2249 financial applications.

    Intriguingly, the modified Faketoken also tries to replace application shortcuts for social media networks, instant messengers and browsers with its own versions. The reason for this is unclear as the substitute icons lead to the same legitimate applications.

    “The latest modification of the Faketoken mobile banking Trojan is interesting in that some of the new features appear to provide limited additional benefit for the attackers. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t take them seriously. They may represent the groundwork for future developments, or reveal the ongoing innovation of an ever-evolving and successful malware family. In exposing the threat, we can neutralise it, and help to keep people, their devices and their data safe,” says Roman Unuchek, senior malware analyst at Kaspersky Lab.


  • New KillDisk wiper varient threatens industrial control networks with Ransomware Trojan

    The TeleBots gang, which recently attacked Ukrainian banks with KillDisk malware that used Mr. Robot imagery (pictured), may now be targeting industrial control systems with a ransomware variant.

    The TeleBots gang, which recently attacked Ukrainian banks with KillDisk malware that used Mr. Robot imagery (pictured), may now be targeting industrial control systems with a ransomware variant.

    The KillDisk disk-wiper program that was used in conjunction with BlackEnergy malware to attack Ukrainian energy utilities has evolved into ransomware that may be targeting industrial-control networks.

    According to researchers at CyberX, the new variant was developed by the TeleBots cybergang, which recently emerged from the Sandworm threat group that is believed to have disrupted the Ukrainian power grid offline in December 2015 and January 2016, and allegedly compromised U.S. industrial-control systems and SCADA systems in 2014. Earlier this year, ESET researchers reported that TeleBots was a using different version of KillDisk to conduct cybersabotage attacks against the Ukrainian financial sector.

    In a blog post on Tuesday, CyberX reported that the ransomware variant is distributed via malicious Office attachments and displays a pop-up message demanding 222 Bitcoins, which is currently the equivalent of approximately $206,000. The variant’s exorbitant ransom and its link to Sandworm suggests that the group could be actively launching ransomware attacks against industrial-control networks.

    KillDisk uses a mix of RSA 1028 public key and AES shared key algorithms to encrypt local hard-drives and network-mapped folders that are shared across organizations, CyberX further reported.